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Nolde and Arbitration of
Post-Contract Disputes
In Nolde Brothers v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers
Union,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the duty to arbitrate
under a collective-bargaining agreement containing a broad and inclusive
arbitration clause extends to disputes arising out of events occurring after
the stated expiration date of the agreement (post-contract disputes). In so
doing, the Court extended to post-contract disputes the strong presump-
tion of arbitrability rule of contract interpretation enunciated in United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.2 The Court, however,
failed to enunciate the best reasons for its decision. The Court also failed to
confront the ramifications of its extension of the strong presumption of
arbitrability to post-contract disputes like the one present in Nolde.
This Case Comment will analyze the soundness of the Court's
decision in light of the reasoning articulated by the Court and in light of the
reasons that the Court failed to enunciate. It will also examine some of the
unresolved issues and problems raised by the Court's decision both in the
context of a continuing employment relationship and in the context of
situations in which the employment relationship has been completely
terminated at the time the dispute arose.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Arbitrability in General
At common law, executory agreements to arbitrate in collective
bargaining agreements were not enforceable in the courts, absent a statute
to the contrary.3 Such agreements were considered incompetent to oust the
courts of their jurisdiction.4 In 1947, partly in response to the growth of
organized labor and the increase in the number of collective-bargaining
agreements, Congress passed sections 203(d)5 and 301(a)6 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. Section 203(d) declared "[f]inal adjustments
by a method agreed upon by the parties . .. to be the desirable method
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. "7 These
1. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
2. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
3. See, e.g., Tatsuuma Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prescott, 4 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1925); Annot.,
135 A.L.R. 79 (1941); Kuelthau, Introduction to Labor Arbitration, 12-2 PRAc. LAw. 61 (1966).
4. See, e.g., Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 881 (6th Cir. 1944).
5. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 203(d), 61 Stat. 154 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976)).
6. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101,§301(a).61 Stat. 156(codifiedat
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)).
7. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 203(d), 61 Stat. 154 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976)).
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sections were interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as creating a
national policy favoring arbitration!
In implementing this national policy, the courts developed a theory of
the structure of collective-bargaining agreements and the arbitration
provisions contained within them to aid in the interpretation of the
agreements and of the laws applicable to them. This theory includes
delineations of the powers of the courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate,
the rights and duties that are normally created by agreements to arbitrate,
the reasons parties to collective-bargaining agreements agree to arbitrate
disputes, and an enunciation of certain national policies to be considered
in the interpretation of agreements to arbitrate. A discussion of the
development of this theory appears below.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills9 and Local 174, Teamsters
v. Lucas Flour Co.,' the Supreme Court dealt with the courts' power to
enforce arbitration agreements and with the rights and duties normally
created by collective-bargaining agreements. In Lincoln Mills, the Court
interpreted section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act as
giving the courts the power to specifically enforce arbitration agreements,
stating that an "agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro
quo for an agreement not to strike."" In Lucas Flour the Court, adopting
the rationale employed by some lower courts and the National Labor
Relations Board, found an implied agreement not to strike in a collective-
bargaining agreement that required the employer to submit disputes to
arbitration.' 2 These lower court decisions provided, first, that arbitration
was intended to provide a substitute for economic resolution of disputes
such as strikes and lockouts.' 3 Second, they stated that allowing strikes in
the face of an arbitration clause would discourage the making of
arbitration agreements and undercut the national policy in favor of
arbitration.' 4 Thus, the courts used their power to enforce arbitration
agreements to establish that collective-bargaining agreements normally
contained coterminous arbitration and no-strike duties.
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers 5 reinforced the Court's
decision in Lucas Flour. The Court in Gateway agreed that the duty to
arbitrate and the duty not to strike remained contractual, and that the two
duties remained analytically distinct.16 But the Court nonetheless said that
when the parties had agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute, the Court
8. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1960).
9. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
10. 369 U.S. 95 (1961).
11. 353 U.S. at 455.
12. 369 U.S. at 104-06.
13. E.g., Teamsters, Local25 v. W.L. Mead, 230 F.2d 577,583-84 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. dlsnulssed,
352 U.S. 802 (1956).
14. W.L. Mead, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1043 (1955).
15. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
16. Id. at 374.
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would imply a duty not to strike absent an explicit expression of a contrary
intent.'7
As we have seen, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills gave courts
the power to specifically enforce arbitration agreements against
employers. The Lincoln Mills Court further held that the anti-injunction
provisions of the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act,'8 which denied the federal
courts jurisdiction to issue an injunction in the adjudication of labor
disputes, were not directed against the courts' power to specifically enforce
agreements to arbitrate. 9 Rather, according to the Court in Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, the Norris-LaGuardia Act was an
attempt by Congress to prevent the federal courts from preliminarily
enjoining, and through the injunction breaking, incipient strikes that the
Congress perceived to be perfectly legal.20
In Boys Markets the Supreme Court extended the lower courts' power
to enforce arbitration agreements by allowing them to enjoin strikes in
violation of such agreements. The Court reasoned that any incentive for
employers to enter into a mandatory arbitration agreement would be
dissipated if the no-strike obligation could not be enforced by an
injunction in addition to an action for money damages.2 In so doing, the
Court adopted language from the dissent in Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson,2 2 which set forth several preconditions for enjoining a strike.
These conditions were that the strike "be over a grievance which both
parties are contractually bound to arbitrate";23 that the court, not the
arbitrator, determine that the collective-bargaining agreement does have
that effect;24 that "the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a
condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike";2 5 and that "the
District Court must . . . consider whether issuance of an injunction
would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity. .... ,12
In Warrior & Gulf, 7 the Supreme Court's concern was to develop a
rule of contract interpretation that would ensure the full implementation
of the national policy in favor of arbitration. The Court dealt in Warrior &
Gulf with a collective-bargaining agreement that linked the duties to
arbitrate and not to strike to disputes arising under, or involving the
17. Id. at 382.
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
19. 353 U.S. at 458.
20. 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
21. Id. at 248.
22. 370 U.S. 195, 215-29 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. 398 U.S. at 254 (quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
24. 398 U.S. at 254.
25. Id. (quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
26. Id.
27. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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application and interpretation of, that agreement. 23 Prior to Warrior &
Gulf, many courts had closely examined the intent of parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement to determine whether a particular dispute
"arose under '29 the contract, declining to order arbitration without
extensive threshold inquiry into whether the substantive rights at issue
might arguably have been created by the contract. Thus, the decision on
the question of arbitrability of a dispute necessarily entailed a decision on
30the merits.
In Warrior & Gulf, the Court virtually eliminated this problem of
courts deciding the merits of disputes "through the back door of
interpreting the arbitration clause. 31 It stated that the national policy is
one favoring arbitration,32 and accordingly created a strong presumption
in favor of arbitrability that arises when the parties have included a broad
and inclusive arbitration provision in the collective-bargaining agreement.
The Court further stated that "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular
grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute. 3 3 Finally, "[i]n the absence of any express
28. The collective-bargaining agreement in Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery
Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 245 (1977) provides an example of such an agreement. That contract
read in part:
Article XII, Grievances and Arbitration:
Section 1. All grievances shall be first taken up between the Phnt Management and the
Shop Steward. If these parties shall be unable to settle the grievance, then the Business Agent
of the Union shall be called in, in an attempt to arrive at a settlement of the grievance, If these
parties are unable to settle the grievance, the dispute will be settled is called for in Sections 2
and 3 of this Article.
Section 2. In the event that any grievance cannot be satisfactorily adjusted by the
procedure outlined above, either of the parties hereto may demand arbitration and shall give
written notice to the other party of its desire to arbitrate.
The agreement in International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Oxco Brush Div. of
Vistron, 517 F.2d 239, 242 (6th Cir. 1975) provides another example: "Step 5-If Settlement is not
reached under Step 4, the grievance may be submitted to Arbitration; providing the grievance involves
the interpretation, application, or alleged violation of the specific provisions of this written
Agrcement."
29. The courts have utilized a test analogous to that used in resolving issues of federal question
jurisdiction-that is, whether a dispute or claim arguably arises under the collectivc-bargaining
agreement-in order to determine the arbitrability of a particular dispute or claim. For a discussion of
federal question jurisdiction, see I MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.62. at 652-73 (2d cd. 1977).
30. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1959), revWd, 363 U.S.
564 (1960).
31. 363 U.S. at 585.
32. Id. at 581-82. See Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HHAv, L. REv 1482, 1490-
1500 (1959). Significantly, in Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms ofthe
Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 Micn. L. REv. I 115, 1116-17 (1965), it is stated:
By an overwhelming majority our respondents indicate that they prefer the arbitration
process to the available alternatives as a method of ultimate resolution of contract
application (grievance) disputes. Only some five percent of our "management" respondents
(including lawyers representing management) indicate a preference for resort to the courts, or
a preference for exclusive reliance on the collective bargaining process including permissive
strike action. Not a single union official respondent prefers either of such methods as an
alternative to arbitration.
But for a criticism of labor arbitration, see P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTINO Viaw (1966),
33. 363 U.S. at 582-83.
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provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration," the Court
required "the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim
from arbitration. 3 4 Thus, after Warrior & Gulf any dispute that is not
expressly or by clear implication excluded by the terms of the arbitration
agreement, and that arose out of events occurring during the stated life of
that agreement, is clearly arbitrable.
B. The Background of the Arbitrability
of Post-Contract Disputes
The problem of courts addressing the merits of disputes, however, was
not completely eliminated by the strong presumption of arbitrability
developed by the Court in Warrior & Gulf. In cases like Nolde,35
concerning disputes arising out of events that occurred after the stated
expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement, but arguably "arising
under" the old agreement or requiring its interpretation and application,
the courts were again tempted to decide the merits of the dispute,
occasionally without even considering the question of arbitrability.
The Supreme Court has twice prior to Nolde been presented With the
question of the arbitrability of post-contract disputes similar to the one at
issue in Nolde. The Court did not, however, clearly resolve the question in
those instances. In the first of these cases, John Wiley & Sons v.
Livingston,36 the Court ruled for arbitration. The main issue in Wiley was
the obligation of successor employers, who had bought out the prior owner
of a company, to arbitrate as provided in the contract that the prior owner
had concluded with the union. Therefore, in its opinion the Court did not
focus on arbitration of post-contract disputes. As a result, the decision in
Wiley did not produce uniformity in the lower federal courts.37
34. Id. at 58485.
35. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union v. Nolde Bros., 382 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D.
Va. 1974), rev'd, 530 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1975), afd, 430 U.S. 243 (1977). The district court determined
that there was no longer an agreement in effect, and that consequently nothing remained to be
arbitrated.
36. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
37. Typically, the claimant seeks arbitration of disputes over arguably vesting rights, such as
severance pay, rights to vacation pay, or seniority rights, when the severance of the employee, the date
for vacation, or the promotion in violation of seniority provisions does not occur until after expiration
of the collective-bargaining agreement that allegedly created the rights. The lower courts have taken
four approaches to deciding these cases. Some courts have decided the merits of the dispute,
determining that no rights survive termination of the contract, and that no issue, therefore, remains to
be arbitrated. Eg., Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union v. Nolde Bros., 382 F. Supp.
1354 (E.D. Va. 1974), rev'd, 530 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1975), afi'd, 430 U.S. 243 (1977). Some courts have
stated that the duty to arbitrate, being contractual, could not survive expiration of the contract. That
analysis necessarily rejects extension of the arguably vesting rights as well.The analysis that concludes
the district court's opinion in Nolde is an example. 382 F. Supp. at 1354. Some courts have denied
arbitration ofthe dispute but acknowledged on the merits that the parties could intend certain arguably
vesting rights to survive termination of the contract. See, e.g., Local58, United Rubber Workers v. Sun
Prods., Corp., 521 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1975); International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 2369 v. Oxco
Brush Div. of Vistron, 517 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1975). Last, some courts have ruled that if the dispute
sought to be arbitrated requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement containing a
broad and inclusive arbitration clause, the strong presumption of arbitrability created by Warrior &
19791
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In the second case, Piano & Musical Instrument Workers, Local2549
v. W. W. Kimball Co.,38 the federal district court ordered arbitration of a
seniority rights dispute. The court also held that the question of
arbitrability was to be determined by the arbitrator. The court assumed in
its decision that, although the parties had had two meetings about seniority
rights before expiration of their collective-bargaining agreement, no
arbitrable dispute over seniority rights arose until after the expiration of
the agreement. It then stated that the parties, according to the terms of
their collective-bargaining agreement, were obligated to arbitrate disputes
concerning the application and interpretation of that agreement, whether
they arose before or after expiration of the agreement. 39 The appellate
court reversed the lower court's holding that the question of arbitrability
was one for the arbitrator.4n It then disagreed with the lower court's
statement that the post-contract dispute was arbitrable, stating that since
the dispute over seniority rights did not arise until after expiration of the
collective-bargaining agreement, the dispute was not arbitrable.
41
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court in a per curiam
decision,4 2 citing United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.43
and Wiley. It was not clear, however, whether the Supreme Court agreed
with the district court's assumption that the dispute arose out of events
occurring after the stated expiration date of the collective-bargaining
agreement, or whether it was relying on some theory of a possible
anticipatory breach on the part of the company with respect to the
employees' future seniority rights, thus giving rise to a dispute over these
rights before expiration of the agreement.44 Because of this confusion,
Piano Workers also failed to eliminate disparate resolutions of the post-
contract arbitration problem in the lower courts; it was thus necessary for
the Supreme Court to decide Nolde.
II. THE Nolde DECISION
A. Facts
In 1970, Nolde Brothers, Inc. and Bakery and Confectionery Workers
Local 358 concluded a collective-bargaining agreement that was to remain
Gulf Navigation applies. E.g., Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union v. Nolde Bros., 530
F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1975), afld, 430 U.S. 243 (1977); Local 595, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Howe Sound
Co., 350 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1965).
38. 221 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Il1. 1963), revd, 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 379 U.S. 357 (1964).
39. 221 F. Supp. at 464.
40. 333 F.2d at 765.
41. Id.
42. Piano & Musical Instrument Workers, Local 2549 v. W.W. Kimball Co., 379 U.S. 357
(1964).
43. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
44. In Nolde, however, the Court clarified itsdecision in Piano Workers. In a footnote, the Court
stated that "the dispute [in Piano Workers] did not arise . . . during the life of the agreement,"Thus,
Piano Workers was cited by the Court as precedent in Nolde. 430 U.S. 243, 252 n.7 (1977).
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in effect from July 28, 1970 to July 21, 1973, and indefinitely thereafter,
with each party having the power to terminate the agreement on seven
days' notice after July 21, 1973. The agreement contained a broad and
inclusive arbitration clause providing that either party could demand
arbitration of any grievance not satisfactorily adjusted by a stipulated
grievance procedure, with "[t]he decision or award of the Arbitration
Board .. . final and binding on both parties."4s The agreement also
provided for vacation pay and severance pay geared to the length of service
of an employee.
In May 1973 the parties began negotiating a new agreement. On
August 20, 1973, after the date triggering the right to terminate (July 21,
1973) had passed, the union gave its notice of termination. Seven days
later, on August 27, 1973, the union's termination of the contract became
effective, although the workers continued working. Negotiations con-
tinued until August 31 when Nolde, threatened with a strike, closed the
plant permanently. Nolde paid the workers their accrued wages and
vacation pay but refused to make any severance payments or to arbitrate
the severance pay issue, stating that the company's duty to pay severance
pay and to arbitrate expired with the expiration of the collective-
bargaining agreement. The union, however, claimed that its members had
acquired rights to severance pay over the years under the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement. The union also maintained that these
rights were irrevocable once they had accrued, and were therefore
enforceable any time a member was severed from hisjob. That is, the union
was claiming that the rights to severance pay were in the nature of vested
rights. Under this interpretation, the only effect that expiration of the
contract would have on severance pay would be that the employees could
not acquire any additional severance pay rights after the expiration. The
employer argued in opposition to this that the expiration of the contract
meant that it could not be relied upon as the source of any severance pay
rights, whether new or old, after the expiration date.
The union sought in federal district court to compel arbitration of the
severance pay dispute. The district court decided that no rights to
severance pay could survive termination of the collective-bargaining
agreement, and that consequently, no issue remained to be arbitrated.46 In
the appellate court, the majority ruled that the district court had erred in
deciding the merits before it decided the question of arbitrability. It then
held, citing the Steelworkers Trilogy, that because the dispute over
severance pay concerned an interpretation of the parties' intent in the old
collective-bargaining agreement, it should be given to the arbitrator for
resolution.47
45. Id. at 245.
46. Local 358, Baker& Confectionery Workers Union v. Nolde Bros., 382 F. Supp. 1354,1358-
59 (E.D. Va. 1974), revd, 530 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1975), affd, 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
47. Local 358, Bakery& Confectionery Workers Union v. Nolde Bros., 530 F.2d 548,552-53 (4th
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B. Holding and Analysis
The United States Supreme Court held that Nolde Brothers, Inc.
should be required to arbitrate the post-contract severance pay dispute,
maintaining that the duty to arbitrate arose from the contract. To
demonstrate this, the Court first pointed out the plausibility of the union's
position that the parties had intended to arbitrate post-contract disputes,
The Court then construed the contract in Nolde as in fact requiring the
arbitration of post-contract disputes.
1. The Plausibility of Post-Contract Arbitration
The Court first emphasized the possibility that the parties could
intend the severance pay rights in dispute to extend until after the stated
expiration date of the agreement: "There is . . . no reason why parties
could not if they so chose agree to the accrual of rights during the term of
an agreement and their realization after the agreement had expired."48 The
Court then pointed out that the duty to arbitrate disputes over the meaning
of collective-bargaining agreements, when the dispute arises or the
arbitration is begun before the stated expiration date of the agreement, is
not automatically extinguished when the stated expiration date arrives.J
Through these examples, the Court demonstrated that the word
"expiration" need not have the effect of automatically cutting off all rights
or duties created by a contract, but rather, that the contract's meaning is
shaped by what the parties intend it to mean.
The situation in Nolde, however, differed from the one posited by the
Court. In Nolde, neither the arbitration nor the dispute arose until after the
expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement. The Court therefore
sought to explain why the duty to arbitrate should extend to the post-
contract disputes at issue in Nolde.
2. Finding an Agreement to Arbitrate
Post-Contract Disputes in Nolde
The Court enumerated five reasons for construing the contract to
require arbitration of post-contract disputes, each of which is subject to
criticism. 0 First, it emphasized that the parties did not expressly exclude
the arbitration of such disputes.5 ' It should be noted, however, that a
Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 243 (1977). The Steelvorkers Trilogy consists of three cases involving
arbitration of disputes, one of which is United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co,, in
which the Court formulated the strong presumption of arbitrability. The other eases are United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
48. 430 U.S. at 249 (quoting John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964)).
49. Id.
50. For a good critique of the Court's interpretation of the agreement to arbitrate, see Goetz,
Arbitration After Termination of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 63 VA. L. REv. 693, 699-709
(1977).
51. 430 U.S. at 252-53.
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determination that the arbitration of post-contract disputes was not
expressly excluded by the parties does not necessitate a finding that such
disputes are subject to arbitration.
A second reason the Court gave for interpreting the parties' contract
as evidencing an intent to arbitrate the dispute in question was that they
had "drafted their broad arbitration clause against a backdrop of well-
established federal labor policy favoring arbitration. ... 2 To infer that
the parties intended post-contract disputes to be arbitrable because they
could expect the courts to apply this federal labor policy to such disputes,
however, imputes to the parties an anticipation of the Court's decision in
Nolde.
Third, the Court pointed out that the contract on its face seemed to
require arbitration of the dispute in question: "The parties agreed to
resolve all disputes by resort to the mandatory grievance-arbitration
machinery. . . .,5 The Court apparently ignored, however, that
normally when a contract expires on a certain date, all rights and duties
under that agreement, or at least the type of rights that do not ordinarily
vest or ripen during the life of a contract, expire as well.The right to compel
arbitration is not the type of right, like the right to unpaid wages under a
three-week employment contract, for example, that parties normally
intend to accrue and vest during the life of a contract and that survives the
stated expiration date of a contract. It is defensible, however, to assert that
the right to press a claim in the arbitral forum attaches to a dispute that is
arguably governed by the collective-bargaining agreement just as the right
to press a claim in the federal courts attaches to a dispute that is arguably
governed by federal law.54 This reasoning should have been more clearly
enunciated by the Court.
The Court also pointed out that the company's interpretation of the
contract "would permit the employer to cut off all arbitration of severance-
pay claims by terminating an existing contract simultaneously with closing
business operations." 5 This statement by the Court necessarily implies
that the parties could never have intended such a result.To the contrary,the
employer might well have intended such a result, and the employer's
meaning might be the more justifiable interpretation of the contract.56 A
very plausible interpretation of the contract is that the parties simply
intended severance pay claims arising out of the severance of one or two
workers to be arbitrable if they occurred during the life of the contract
because of the normal variations of the business cycle. This would not
mean that the parties had any intent about what should be arbitrable in the
event that an entire plant was closed after expiration of the contract.
52. Id. at 254.
53. Id. at 252 (emphasis in original).
54. See note 29 supra.
55. 430 U.S. at 253.
56. See Goetz, supra not. 50, at 703-04.
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Alternatively, the employer could have intended, by choosing the language
in question, to avoid severance payments and arbitration of disputes over
them.
As a fifth reason for its decision, the Court indicated why the parties
would have chosen to arbitrate disputes over the application of the
collective-bargaining agreement. Here the Court incorporated into its
opinion the reasoning behind its formulation of the strong presumption in
favor of arbitrability in Warrior & Gulf. The Court in Nolde began by
enumerating the usual reasons for parties agreeing to arbitrate their
disputes. First it cited the arbitrator's special expertise for filling in the gaps
in collective-bargaining agreements, attributable to his knowledge of the
"common law of the shop, '5 7 and that "the alternative remedy of a lawsuit
is the very remedy the arbitration clause was designed to avoid." 58 Then the
Court noted that "[w]hile the termination of the collective-bargaining
agreement works an obvious change in the relationship between employer
and union, it would have little impact on many of the considerations
behind their decision to resolve their contractual differences through
arbitration."59 It must be emphasized, however, that the advantages of
arbitration over courtroom litigation, although presumably applicable to
the present case, did not prevent Nolde, Inc. from willingly entering
protracted litigation and foregoing those benefits.
The Nolde opinion did not make clear whether the Court reached its
result because it discerned the parties' actual intent, or whether it reached
its result because it thought that the reasons it cited would have caused the
parties to have that intent had they thought about that problem at the time
of contract formation. It is unlikely that the parties thought about the
problem of post-contract arbitration at the time they formulated their
contract. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Court could have based its
decision on their actual intent. It is, however, quite possible, in light of all
the facts cited by the Court, that the parties in Nolde would have included
suchX disputes as arbitrable had they thought about them, thus making the
union's interpretation of the contract-the one adopted by the Court-the
most justifiable.
III. UNENUNCIATED REASONS FOR
THE COURT'S DECISION
That the Court in Nolde construed the parties' contract to include
post-contract disputes as arbitrable is not the most significant part of the
decision. More significant is the rule or method of contract interpretation
that the Nolde Court laid down for the lower courts. The Court itself
inquired about and enumerated reasons why the parties to the agreement
57. 430 U.S. at 253.




would intend to arbitrate the post-contract dispute at issue.6 0 Nevertheless,
rather than establish a rule of contract interpretation that would allow the
lower courts to interpret agreements to arbitrate by looking at all the
evidence relevant to a determination of the parties' intent, the Court
invoked the strong presumption of arbitrability that it had formulated in
Warrior & Gulf.6'
The Court in Nolde did not endeavor to explain or justify its
"removal" of the lower courts' power to construe Nolde-type agreements.
In order to explain the advisability of this removal, broader policy reasons
than those discussed by the Court in its interpretation of the single contract
in Nolde must be examined.
A. The General Application of Reasons for Arbitration
The five reasons that the Court cited for its construction of the parties'
contract in Nolde-that the parties did not expressly exclude arbitration of
post-contract disputes, that the contract was drafted against a backdrop of
federal policy favoring arbitration, that the contract on its face seemed to
require arbitration of the dispute, that the company's interpretation would
allow it to cut off all post-contract claims by waiting to close the plant (or
layoff workers) until an existing contract expired, and that the arbitrator
would have special expertise and his services would be less expensive than
litigation-would almost always apply to situations in which the meaning
of a broad and inclusive arbitration clause is at issue.
This may have been one reason for the Court's extension of the
presumption of arbitrability to post-contract disputes. Nonetheless, the
existence of the Court's assumed reasons that parties choose to arbitrate
may not be demonstrable by evidence in every instance, and perhaps
should not simply be assumed to exist in the context of every post-contract
dispute. Furthermore, even if these assumed reasons do apply to every
post-contract dispute, a party may still be able to bring before the court
other facts and evidence that override these considerations.
B. Avoidance of Delay
Another reason not discussed by the Court for its extension of the
strong presumption rule of contract interpretation to post-contract
disputes is a discernible reluctance on the part of the Court to delay
resolution of industrial disputes by encouraging, or failing to discourage,
litigation over the issue of arbitrability. The Court's failure to discuss this
reason in Nolde is understandable, since the benefits of avoiding this delay
would not apply to a Nolde-type situation, when the plant has been closed
and the employment relationship terminated. It is, however, a strong
60. Id. at 252-55.
61. Id. at 254-55.
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reason for extending the strong presumption for arbitration to post-
contract disputes in the context of an ongoing employment relationship,
By extending the strong presumption in this context, the Court has
enabled parties to collective-bargaining agreements to assess their rights
and duties concerning arbitrability without asking for a judicial
interpretation. Prolonged courtroom dispute about the proper forum for
resolution of the workers' or employer's grievance could lead to loss of
wages and production and generally sour the employer-employee
relationship. Under Nolde, when a dispute does arise, the parties can
quickly submit it to the arbitrator, obtain resolution, and get on with
production, rather than risking the deleterious side effects and costs of a
courtroom determination of their rights under the arbitration agreement.
Without an expedited procedure, wildcat strikes or at least slowdowns
could occur.
This consideration may not be reason enough for preventing the
courts from inquiring into the parties' true intent in Nolde-type situations.
But the approach taken by the Court in Nolde becomes considerably more
compelling when the consequences of that approach are compared with
the meager benefits the courts could expect from inquiring into the parties'
intent. As was probably the case in Nolde, it is doubtful that the parties
would have thought about the problem of post-contract arbitration when
they formulated their contract.62 In most cases, therefore, the long delay
and high cost of a court proceeding would turn up no evidence of intent.
Thus, the courts would be fostering industrial unrest by inviting delay in
the resolution of industrial disputes, for the minimal reward of gaining
little more than an educated guess about what the parties actually
contemplated.63
C. Leaving the Decision on the
Merits to the Arbitrator
Perhaps the main virtue of the Nolde decision is that it furthers the
policy of preventing the courts from deciding the merits of collective-
bargaining disputes "through the back door of . . . the arbitration
62. Goetz, supra note 50, at 704.
63. Cf. Jones, The Name of the Game is Decision-Some Rejictlons on "Arbitrability" and
"Authority" in Labor Arbitration, 46 TEXAS L. Ray. 865, 869 (1968):
The fundamental reason for requiring courts to abstain from interposing to oust
arbitration except in the clearest of cases is the paramount necessity to avoid external
tampering with the machinery of industrial self-government lest the will to govern, which Is to
say, bargain, be enervated. Vital to the operation of that machinery is the need for rapid
resolution of labor disputes by an individual to whose judgment the parties have chosen to
submit, thereby avoiding enmeshing in litigation-and exacerbating-what typically arc
highly charged, often personally colored issues.
Although Jones is concerned with courts ousting the arbitrator and the consequent disruption of




clause. '64 The Court did not enunciate this as a reason for its decision in
Nolde. It is probable, however, that this consideration entered into the
Court's extension of the strong presumption for arbitrability to post-
contract disputes,65 since this consideration heavily influenced its decision
in Warrior & Gulf, in which the strong presumption was first formulated
by the Court.66 The problem of back-door merits decisions arose before the
application of the strong presumption because of the peculiar way that
broad and inclusive arbitration clauses link the right to compel arbitration
of a dispute to the arguable validity of the right asserted in the dispute. The
ramifications of this type of adjudication can best be demonstrated by
examining a hypothetical situation factually similar to the Nolde case.
Assume an agreement between Plower and Storeowner, under which
Plower agrees to clear the snow from Storeowner's parking lot every time
there is a "measurable snow" between November 1, 1978 and March 1,
1979. Assume that Plower and Storeowner have agreed to arbitrate any
dispute over the meaning of their contract. A dispute over whether enough
snow had fallen to justify clearing, for example, would clearly be arbitrable
according to the terms of the agreement.
To bring the facts of the hypothetical closer to Nolde, let us further
assume that Plower and Storeowner each agreed to contribute to an
insurance policy covering damage to Plower's snow plow. This policy is
not limited to damages occurring during Plower's activities on
Storeowner's lot, but rather covers all damages to the plow. Let us further
assume that Plower intends to put the snow plow in storage and let the
policy lapse on April 30, 1979. After March 1, 1979, Plower seeks to
compel Storeowner to pay Storeowner's share of the premiums on the
insurance policy, claiming that Storeowner agreed to pay half of the
premiums for the months of March and April. Storeowner refuses. May a
court compel Storeowner to arbitrate this dispute? It is probable that many
courts would conclude that there is no arguable dispute and therefore no
resultant duty to arbitrate. In effect, the court would be deciding the merits
of the dispute if it decided, on the basis of insufficient plausibility of the
contract claim, to deny arbitration.
Allowing the courts broad powers to deny arbitrability because the
claim asserted is not sufficiently plausible may be a good policy for
interpreting commercial agreements like the one between Storeowner and
Plower. These parties can make their agreements as explicit as they wish.
The collective-bargaining agreement, however, is a sketchy agreement
designed to be comprehensible to the union members who must vote on it.
The parties customarily rely on an arbitrator to fill in the gaps. In this
context, permitting the courts to delve into the merits through
64. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960).
65. See Goetz, supra note 50, at 707-08.
66. 363 U.S. at 583-85.
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interpretation of the arbitration clause could cut off many valid claims
before they reach the arbitrator.67 It is just this result that the Court's
strong presumption in favor of arbitrability was designed to prevent.
The Court in Warrior & Gulf, and again in Nolde, has decided that in
light of the skeletal nature of collective bargaining agreements, it is better
to err in favor of arbitrability to ensure that the courts do not cut off any
valid claims. To this end the Supreme Court has extended the presumption
of arbitrability to post-contract disputes, requiring the courts to find in
favor of arbitrability unless arbitration of the particular dispute is negated
expressly or by clear implication.
IV. ISSUES RAISED BY Nolde
A. Extension of the No-Strike Duty
to the Post-Contract Period
An issue raised by the Nolde decision and commented upon by the
dissent is whether the duty not to strike over post-contract disputes
survives the stated expiration date of the contract. If it does not, then the
Court's decision would have the effect of requiring the employer to
arbitrate a dispute over which the union could still strike. For that reason
the dissent accused the majority of dispensing with the quid pro quo
relationship between the duty to arbitrate and the duty not to strike. The
dissent in Nolde indicated that it considered "the Union's termination of
the contract [as] releasing it from its obligation not to strike, foreclos[ing]
any reason for implying a continuing duty on the part of the employer to
arbitrate. ,,6 A close reading of the case law, however, and the pattern
it represents, indicates that the quid pro quo relationship between
arbitration and the prohibition of strikes will probably be preserved, with
the union's duty not to strike attaching to any dispute that the court has
determined the employer has a duty to arbitrate. In 1970, in Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,69 the Supreme Court held that a
federal district court could enjoin a strike if the strike was "over a grievance
which both parties [were] contractually bound to arbitrate" and the court
bound the employer "to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an
injunction against the strike., 70 In 1971, in Kauai Electric Co. v. IBEW
67. Because the district court in Nolde summarily dismissed the union's claim to severance pay
for its members, it is probable that the court, had it first decided the question of arbitrability, would
have found that the severance pay dispute had not arguably arisen under the collective-bargainIng
agreement and was therefore not arbitrable. The numerous cases indicating that partids to al
agreement could intend severance pay rights to survive expiration of a contract, however, provide
evidence that the claim is at least arguable. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,
555 (1964) ("We see no reason why parties could not if they so chose to agree to the accrual of rights
during the term of an agreement and their realization after the agreement had expired,"); Local 58,
United Rubber Workers v. Sun Prods., Corp., 521 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1975); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Howe Sound Co., 350 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1965); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., 208
N.L.R.B, 125 (1974).
68. 430 U.S. at 257 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
69. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
70. Id. at 254.
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Local 126071 a United States District Court held that it had the power to
enjoin a strike over a dispute arising out of events occurring during the
period of the collective-bargaining agreement, even though arbitration
and the strike were not begun until after the stated expiration date of the
agreement. The court stated that it did not view the existence of a current
collective-bargaining agreement as a prerequisite to enjoining the strike. It
required only "that the strike sought to be enjoined [be] 'over a grievance
which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate,' "7 2 citing Boys
Markets.
Thus, in Kauai the duty not to strike accompanied the duty to
arbitrate into the period after the stated expiration date of the collective-
bargaining agreement. If one is willing to accept the Kauai decision, it is
arguable that the no-strike duty will also accompany the arbitration duty
in Nolde-type situations, in which the events giving rise to the dispute
occur after the stated expiration date of the contract. Kauai suggests that
the existence of the no-strike duty is governed by the existence of a duty to
arbitrate and not by the term of the collective-bargaining agreement.
73
Even stronger support for extending the no-strike duty along with the
arbitration duty is found in the Supreme Court's decision in Gateway Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers.74 In Gateway the Court upheld a district
court decision enjoining a strike over a safety measure dispute that the
union claimed was not subject to the arbitration clause of the collective-
bargaining agreement. The Court held that the strong presumption of
arbitrability of Warrior & Gu/fapplied75 and that the dispute was therefore
arbitrable. The Court cited Boys Markets in holding that the district court
had the power to enjoin the strike, stating that "[a]bsent an explicit
expression of . . . an intention [that the duty to arbitrate not be
accompanied by a duty not to strike], the agreement to arbitrate and the
duty not to strike should be construed as having coterminous applica-
tion. 76 Having found that the dispute was arbitrable, the Court then
created a strong presumption of a no-strike duty that parallels the strong
presumption of the duty to arbitrate. It is unlikely that the courts will
depart from this line of reasoning in Nolde-type situations and deny
injunctions of strikes over post-contract disputes that have been deemed
arbitrable.
71. 79 L.R.R.M. 2838 (D. Haw. 1971).
72. Id. at 2843.
73. See Goya Foods, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 204, 99 L.R.R.M. 1282, 1284(1978). In Goya the
National Labor Relations Board enjoined a strike begun after expiration of the collective-bargaining
agreement over grievances arising out of the discharge of certain employees during the term of the
agreement Although the dispute in Goya, unlike Nolde, began during the life of the agreement, the
Board cited Nolde, stating: "The agreement 'lives' on in the duty to arbitrate; so should theduty not to
strike live on to the extent of the duty to arbitrate over issues created by or arising out of the expired
agreement."
74. 414 U.S. 368 (1973).
75. Id. at 377-79.
76. Id. at 382.
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It should be recognized that the courts' power to enjoin strikes over
post-contract disputes is of no significance in Nolde-type situations, in
which the plant has closed and there is no longer any possibility of a strike.
It is, however, a significant consideration in extending the duty to arbitrate
to post-contract disputes when the employment relationship has not been
terminated. If the lower courts have the power to enjoin strikes over post-
contract disputes that have been declared arbitrable, both parties will be
precluded from resorting to the economic forum for a resolution of their
differences. This is best demonstrated by considering a situation in which
there is a gap between the expiration date of an old collective-bargaining
agreement and the effective date of a new one, each of which contain broad
and inclusive arbitration clauses. Suppose that after the formulation of the
new agreement, a dispute arises out of the severance of a number of
employees during the hiatus between the stated expiration date of the old
agreement and the effective date of the new one. If this dispute is not
declared arbitrable by the courts because it concerns interpretation of the
old agreement, there will be nothing to trigger the union's duty not to strike
over that dispute. The Court's decisions in Boys Markets, Inc. v, Retail
Clerks Union, Local 77077 and Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers78
point to this result. In Boys Markets the Court ruled that a strike could be
enjoined only if the employer was under a duty to arbitrate and agreed to
submit the dispute to arbitration as a precondition to the injunction. In
Buffalo Forge, the Court refused to enjoin a sympathy strike in the face of
an express no-strike clause, because "[t]he strike had neither the purpose
nor the effect of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of
depriving the employer of its bargain" since it was not a strike over a
disagreement between the union and the employer about the collective-
bargaining agreement.79
Therefore, an employer who had signed an agreement containing
inclusive arbitration and no-strike clauses could find himself nonetheless
subject to a strike because of a dispute over the old collective-bargaining
agreement. Although the employer could also be subjected to nonen-
joinable strikes if the parties expressly excluded such disputes from
arbitration, an unclear contract should certainly be construed to avoid this
result.
B. Enjoining Strikes Over Fabricated Disputes
A problem raised by the possible extension to the post-contract
period of the courts' ability to enjoin strikes is the danger of strikes
ostensibly concerning disputes not covered by the duty to arbitrate but
actually concerning the particular dispute subject Io arbitration. Assume,
77. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
78. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
79. Id. at 408.
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for example, that there is a dispute over the severance pay rights created by
an expired collective-bargaining agreement and that no new collective-
bargaining agreement has been entered into by the union and the
employer. A strike to protest the disciplining of an employee that occurred
after expiration of the old agreement, or to extract concessions from the
employer in the negotiations of a new agreement, would not be enjoinable
because these disputes would not be governed by any collective-bargaining
agreement. Thus, the union could call a strike, insisting that it is over
disciplinary measures, when in reality the strike is based upon the
severance pay dispute.
The courts' power under Boys Markets to enjoin such strikes may
lessen this problem. The Court in Boys Markets required that a court
determine that a strike is over a dispute the employer is under a duty to
arbitrate before an injunction may issue. To make such a determination,
the court must necessarily possess the ability to look beyond the label given
a strike to determine its true origin.
Furthermore, the problem of fabricated reasons for strikes may not be
as great as it seems at first glance, since a strike is only effective if it can be
used to extract concessions from the employer. If the union strikes over a
grievance ostensibly not subject to arbitration, actually intending to force
the employer to settle an arbitrable dispute in the union's favor, it is diffi-
cult to imagine how the union could make known to the employer the price
for ending the strike without belying the strike's true nature.80
C. The Limited Value to Employers of the
Quid Pro Quo Relationship
Preservation of the quidpro quo relationship between the arbitration
duty and the no-strike duty on a dispute-by-dispute basis is of little
comfort to an employer forced to arbitrate with the union over one dispute
and faced with a nonenjoinable strike over another. The alternative,
however, seems to be to prevent the union from striking over any disputes
that it has with the employer if a duty exists to arbitrate even a single
dispute. Under such a rule, the courts would be forced to enjoin strikes
over disputes that no one had a duty to arbitrate. This would clearly con-
flict with the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as
construed by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets, which required as a
prerequisite to an injunction that the employer be under a duty and agree
to arbitrate the dispute about which the union was striking.81 The Court's
80. See Goya Foods, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 204,99 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1978). In Go)y the union
struck after the expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement. Shortly after the strike began, the
union added a new contract and recognition of a new bargaining agent as conditions for ending the
strike. The union argued that, although reinstatement was an arbitrable issue, the dispute over a new
contract and recognition of a new bargaining agent were not subject to arbitration and therefore the
strike was not enjoinable. The NLRB held that as long as one of the unions conditions for ending the
strike was the subject of an arbitrable dispute, the whole strike was"tainted" and therefore enjoinable.
81. 398 U.S. at 254. For a brief discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see text accompanying
note 18 supra.
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decision in Nolde, extending the duty to arbitrate into the post-contract
period, increases the likelihood of coexisting arbitrable and nonarbitrable
disputes, which gives rise to this dilemma. The Courts should have at least
considered this problem before it extended the strong presumption of
arbitrability to post-contract disputes.
D. The Court's Departure From the
"Substitution for Industrial
Strife" Rationale of Arbitration
Both the strong presumption of arbitrability in Warrior & Gulf 2 and
the quid pro quo relationship between the arbitration duty and the no-
strike duty8 3 were based in large part on the rationale that arbitration is a
substitute for industrial strife. In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court stated
that "the very purpose of arbitration is to provide a mechanism for the
expeditious settlement of industrial disputes without resort to strikes,
lockouts or other self-help measures. 84 It also suggested that "[a]ny
incentive for employers to enter into [agreements to arbitrate] is
necessarily dissipated" if the no-strike obligation cannot be enforced by an
injunction. 85 Furthermore, when formulating the strong presumption for
arbitrability in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the
Court emphasized that, while "in the commercial case, arbitration is the
substitute for litigation," in the industrial relations case "arbitration is the
substitute for industrial strife. 8 6 When a plant is closed, however, as in
Nolde, industrial strife is no longer possible. Thus, the Court departed
from its emphasis on strike avoidance as a reason for arbitration. The
Court instead emphasized in Nolde that "[b]y their contract the parties
clearly expressed a preference for an arbitral rather than a judicial
interpretation of their obligations" and that "the alternative remedy of the
lawsuit [was] the very remedy the arbitration clause was designed to
avoid. 87 The Court reasoned that the parties' interest in avoiding
litigation and having an expert arbitrator interpret their agreement would
apply to a closed-plant situation as well as to an ongoing employer-
employee relationship. Therefore, the Court felt free to dispense with the
quid pro quo relationship by requiring arbitration in the closed-plant
context. Although the dissent criticized the majority for dispensing with
the quid pro quo relationship between the arbitration and no-strike
duties, 88it is not at all a foregone conclusion that such a relationship must
necessarily exist. It is quite possible that the parties in Nolde concluded
82. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
83. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
84. 398 U.S. 235, 249 (1970).
85. Id. at 248.
86. 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
87. 430 U.S. at 253-54.
88. Id. at 256-57 (Stewart, 3., dissenting).
[Vol. 40:187
POST-CONTRA CT ARBITRATION
their collective-bargaining agreement with the assumption in mind that an
arbitrator would interpret it, even in the absence of a quid pro quo
relationship.
It is unfortunate, however, that the Court extended the strong
presumption of arbitrability to the closed-plant context. The strong
presumption effectively removes the lower courts' power to interpret
arbitration clauses in collective-bargaining agreements. The consequent
discouragement of litigation over the meaning of arbitration is desirable in
the context of continuing operations when delays in resolution of
difficulties can cause loss of production or other industrial problems.
When the employment relationship has terminated, however, there will be
no industrial strife to avert by not taking the time to discern the parties'
intent concerning arbitration.89
Thus, the crucial question becomes whether the parties' interest in
avoiding litigation and the judicial policy of preventing courts from
deciding the merits of a dispute through the "back door" of the arbitration
clause in themselves justify a removal of the lower courts' power to
interpret arbitration agreements. It is doubtful that they do. The Supreme
Court, in Warrior & Gulf, distinguished industrial arbitration-the
substitute for industrial conflict-from commercial arbitration-the
substitute for litigation-when it articulated the strong presumption of
arbitrability.90 Thus, the Court itself apparently did not deem mere
avoidance of litigation a sufficient reason for applying a strong
presumption of arbitrability.
Furthermore, there is little reason to assume that the lower courts will
fail to recognize the parties' interest in avoiding litigation and the danger of
deciding the merits of a dispute through the "back door" of the arbitration
clause. 9' Thus, it would seem that the formulation of a weak presumption
of arbitrability, instructing the lower courts to order arbitration of a
dispute unless the employer proves with clear and convincing evidence that
his interpretation of the arbitration agreement is the more justifiable,
would amply support the policy in favor of arbitration.
E. Limiting the Duration of the Duty to Arbitrate
One problem that the Court declined to consider in Nolde was the
point at which the duty to arbitrate post-contract disputes ceases.92 The
Court implicitly recognized that the duty to arbitrate could not extend
forever, commenting that it "need not speculate as to the arbitrability of
post-termination contractual claims which, unlike the one presently before
us, are not asserted within a reasonable time after the contract's
89. See Goetz, supra note 50, at 706-07.
90. 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). The Court's language is quoted in the text accompanying note
86 supra.
91. See Goetz, supra note 50, at 706-07.
92. 430 U.S. at 255.
1979]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
expiration. 93 Ascertaining what constitutes a reasonable time will prove
to be a difficult, if not an impossible task. Furthermore, confusion
generated by this question would invite litigation over the interpretation of
"reasonable time." This undercuts the main advantage of the strong
presumption of arbitrability-avoiding courtroom delay and the in-
dustrial unrest that it might cause. Requiring the employer to arbitrate the
validity of any claim made by the union while the union is still the
employees' representative would be a better solution to this problem. As
long as the union is still the employees' representative, there is little reason
to require the parties to settle their disputes in the courts rather than before
an arbitrator.94 If the employer does not want to arbitrate these disputes,
he can insist on the union entering into a collective-bargaining agreement
barring arbitration of post-contract disputes. The agreement could further
provide that any disputes over rights accrued or vesting under old
agreements also be resolved in the courts.
F. Guidance for the Lower Courts
Finally, the Supreme Court should have set guidelines declaring
which rights could arguably vest during the life of an agreement and thus
be subject to arbitration after its expiration. Such rights might include
seniority rights, vacation pay rights, or severance pay rights. Without such
guidelines, unions may phrase certain claims, such as disciplinary claims
occurring during the hiatus between two collective-bargaining agreements,
in a manner that suggests that they arguably arose under the old
agreement, simply for the purpose of gaining arbitration of the dispute. A
literal reading of the Supreme Court's language in Wiley and Nolde
suggests that such disputes would be arbitrable in the absence of a clearly
implied or express exclusion. But such a literal reading by the lower courts
might yield an unfortunate result. Fear that they may be required to
arbitrate any cleverly phrased claim, regardless of the possible nonvesting
nature of the right claimed, may cause employers to insist on the
exclusionary clause suggested by the Court in Nolde.95 If that is the case,
the Court will find that its decision discourages rather than encourages
arbitration of disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
In Nolde the Supreme Court extended the strong presumption of
93. Id. at 255 n.8.
94. See Moruzzi v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 443 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Dynamics
Corporation closed its plant on December 1, 1970. Later in December, Local 478, the union
representing the employees, ceased to exist. The company pension plan was low on funds and it was
discovered that some employees would receive no pension at all. A special committee was formed by
the workers to try to compel arbitration in the federal courts. The courts held that the committee was
not the representative of the employees and therefore could not arbitrate the dispute. It suggested that
the employees could press their claims in the courts as individuals.
95. 430 U.S. at 255.
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arbitrability-a rule of contract interpretation-that it had enunciated in
Warrior & Gulf to disputes arising out of events occurring after the stated
expiration date of a collective-bargaining agreement. Lower courts must
now order arbitration of these post-contract disputes unless they are
expressly or by clear implication excluded from arbitration by the parties'
agreement. This is a good result, although the Court failed to articulate the
best reasons for it.
The decision furthers a judicial policy of discouraging litigation over
the question whether the arbitrator or the courts should decide a dispute.
The primary benefit of that policy is that it prevents the courts from cutting
off arbitration of potentially valid claims that are not readily evident to the
courts because of the sketchy character of collective-bargaining agree-
ments. Finally, the decision restrains the lower courts from inquiring,
perhaps fruitlessly, into the parties' intent in every instance, and thus
avoids delays in the resolution of disputes and possible resulting industrial
unrest.
The decision in Nolde is not without problems, however. It raises the
question whether the Court has dispensed with the quid pro quo
relationship between the no-strike duty and the duty to arbitrate.
Although the Court probably has not abolished the relationship in the
context of continuing plant operations, the duty not to strike over certain
arbitrable disputes after expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement
will be of little worth to the employer if that duty is swallowed up by strikes
over nonarbitrable disputes. In the context of arbitration after a plant-
closing, the Court has moved away from the quidpro quo relationship.
Of greater significance is the Court's departure from its statement that
arbitration is a substitute for the industrial resolution of disputes,
emphasizing instead in Nolde that arbitration is a substitute for litigation.
Finally, the Court should have limited more clearly the duty to arbitrate to
arguably vesting rights like severance pay, vacation pay, and seniority pay,
even though such a limitation is in itself a decision on the merits. By
speaking too broadly in Nolde, the Court may unwittingly have provoked
employers to insist that collective-bargaining agreements exclude
arbitration of all post-contract disputes, to the ultimate detriment of the
national policy favoring arbitration.
David L. Feldwisch
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